In 2016, the Federal Court decided on a landmark decision in Ridzwan Bin Abdul Razak v Asmah Binti Hj Mohd Nor [2016] 4 MLJ 282 recognising harassment as an actionable tort in Malaysia.

To my mind, the decision in Ridzwan (supra) saw a wholesale adoption of common law principles of harassment with the majority of its jurisprudence being imported from the United Kingdom and our neighbours in Singapore.

At this point, the laws in United Kingdom and Singapore were far developed, receiving even legislative recognition in the UK Protection from Harassment Act 1977 and the Equality Act 2010 whilst Singapore also has a Protection from Harassment Act 2014.

The decision in Ridzwan (supra) however, was focused on workplace harassment or to be more exact, the reliefs available for natural persons’ right to sue for harassment. With that, the question arises as to whether corporate entities are afforded such protection.

This article discusses the development of the tort of harassment in Malaysia and considers the extension of its protection to corporate entities as victims of the same.

Aspire NXT Sdn Bhd v Nirmlina A/P Amal Das [2024] 10 MLJ 524

This case concerns a company that had initiated a suit for, inter alia, harassment against its former employee. The High Court suit was commenced in 2022.

The facts, in brief, began with the Plaintiff’s termination of employment of the Defendant, which was followed by the Defendant’s dissemination of selective records of communications between herself and the company director to numerous parties within the company, including those uninvolved in her termination. The dissemination was persistent and widespread in nature.

After a full trial, the High Court judge, Roz Mawar Rozain JC (as she then was), allowed the claim in the tort of harassment with damages, and granted mandatory and perpetual prohibitory injunctive reliefs against the Defendant.

The parties then filed a cross-appeal at the Court of Appeal, the Plaintiff for, among others, quantum and determination of liability of other causes of action mounted in the High Court, and the Defendant, on the finding of liability against herself.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Plaintiff’s appeal and, allowed the Defendant’s appeal in part. ‘In part’ because even though the Court of Appeal reversed the Defendant’s liability for harassment, the Court of Appeal thought it fit to maintain the injunctive reliefs granted by High Court restraining the Defendant from ever harassing the Plaintiff. 

What is peculiar about this situation is that the injunctive reliefs technically do not contain any cause of action as a foundation. This I suppose, would be a discussion for a different article.

On 29 September 2025, the Plaintiff (now Applicant) had obtained leave to Federal Court on the following questions of law:

1. Whether the tort of harassment as recognised by the Federal Court in its decision of Ridzwan (supra), is an available cause of action to companies in light of, inter alia, the following:
   1. Section 3 of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 which defines “person” to include a corporate body of persons.
   2. Notwithstanding that a company is incapable of experiencing feelings of alarm, fear or distress, the fact that a company may be injured by way of annoyance and distress of its employees as well as disruption to its business activities which would invariably cause losses and/or damage to the company. …

2. If Question 1 is answered in the negative, whether there exists a policy consideration to recognise the tort of harassment as being actionable by a corporate person and/or companies…

At the time of writing, the hearing on merits of the appeal is pending before the Federal Court.

An Analysis of the Tort of Harassment in Common Law Jurisdictions

As mentioned, the tort of harassment was recognised in Malaysia by the Federal Court in Ridzwan (supra), just ten years before this article.

Ridzwan (supra) essentially imported and welcomed the adoption of English common law principles on the tort of harassment. The Federal Court also noted the inclusion of sexual harassment as part of its recognition of the tort. The Singapore High Court decision in Malcomson Nicholas Hugh Bertram & Anor v Naresh Kumar Mehta [2001] 4 SLR 454 was among the decisions referred to by the Federal Court.

To consider whether a corporate entity possesses the legal capacity to bring an action in the tort of harassment, Malcomson is an indicative source. Alongside the first Plaintiff, Malcomson himself, the second Plaintiff in the suit was ‘Zerity’, which was the employer company of the first Plaintiff and the Defendant.

In Malcomson, the tort of harassment was recognised and defined in the following manner:

[31] …For the purposes of this application I shall take the term ‘harassment’ to mean a course of conduct by a person, whether by words or action, directly or through third parties, sufficiently repetitive in nature as would cause, and which he ought reasonably to know would cause, worry, emotional distress or annoyance to another person. This is not intended to be an exhaustive definition of the term but rather one that sufficiently encompasses the facts of the present case in order to proceed with a consideration of the law.

The question then arises as to whether the tort of harassment is only actionable by a natural person. Returning to Malaysia, in the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court in Aspire NXT, the Plaintiff’s counsel invited the Courts to consider the following:

1. Section 3 of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 defines “person” as including a corporate body of persons.
2. A company may be injured by way of the annoyance and distress suffered by its employees, and by the disruption to its business activities, which invariably causes losses and/or damage to the company.
3. The course of conduct by the Defendant in the suit was calculated to cause alarm, fear, or distress.

To further discuss point number 3, a comparison between the tort of harassment and the tort of sexual harassment is worth pondering.

The judgment in Ridzwan referred to the Malcomson definition of the tort of harassment, which discusses the nature of the course of conduct. There is an obvious difference in definition when we consider what constitutes sexual harassment. Also considered in Ridzwan, the 1999 Practice Code, at Article 4, describes sexual harassment in the following manner:

any unwanted conduct of a sexual nature having the effect of verbal, non-verbal, visual, psychological or physical harassment;

1. that might, on reasonable grounds, be perceived by the recipient as placing a condition of a sexual nature on her/his employment; or
2. that might, on reasonable grounds, be perceived by the recipient as an offence or humiliation, or a threat to her/his well-being, but has no direct link to her or his employment.

The point taken here is that, for sexual harassment, it is the perception of the recipient that the law questions. In contrast, the tort of harassment questions the nature of the conduct.

As mentioned above, the United Kingdom and Singapore also provide statutory protection against harassment, which is not present in Malaysia. For completeness, Chapter XXII of the Penal Code addresses criminal intimidation, insult and annoyance. 

Interestingly, on 9 January 2026, the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal issued a judgment recognising the tort of harassment, but expressly pronounced that a company cannot sue for harassment, as it is incapable of suffering emotional distress (see: Samantha Jane Bradley v Sir Elly Kadoorie & Sons Limited (for and on behalf of itself, its current and former officers, employees and agents, including its legal representatives, Messrs Simmons & Simmons) [2026] HKCFA 2).

However, it would be rather far-fetched to say that the Malaysian Court of Appeal in Nirmlina (supra) had relied on the Hong Kong Court of Appeal’s decision in Samantha Jane Bradley (supra) that companies cannot be injured in their feelings, considering that the grounds of judgment has yet to be completed and Samantha Jane Bradley (supra) was decided only this year (2026). In Malaysia, the situation is rather different considering that corporate entities too can sue and recover for inconvenience, embarrassment, and damage to reputation, which will be reflected in their goodwill (see: Goo Sing Kar v Dato’ Lim Ah Chap & Ors [2013] 2 CLJ 936).

Conclusion

As a closing note, it would be far too early to say that corporate entities are entitled to sue for harassment before the Federal Court renders its decision. It is noteworthy however, that at this point and save for Hong Kong, other common law jurisdictions have yet to take an express position on the question.